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Talking paper for the Chairman, JCS

Subject: Analysis of an Article Concerning Cuba
Planning Which Appeared in the ST LOUIS
POST DISPATCH of 30 November 1962

Background - The subject article was written by Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Phillips, USA (Ret), military analyst of the POST DISPATCH and headlined "CUBA INVASION ORGANIZATION, PLANS WERE MISHANDLED, ARMY, AIR FORCE OFFICERS SAY." Further criticism drawn from the lead paragraph is quoted as follows: "The organization and command and control plans for an invasion of Cuba were mishandled and, if an invasion had been necessary, would have caused great confusion with consequent loss of life and delayed success, senior Army and Air Force officers contend."

Discussion - An analysis of the points raised in the article indicates that the author utilized a paucity of fact, misinterpreted the command relationships, and over-emphasized minor problems. In short, references in the article which would indicate that it reflects statements made by, or views held by, senior military men are untrue. Similarly, none of the criticisms levelled by the article are considered valid.

- Command relationships for the planning for, as well as the conduct of, operations in regard to Cuba were, and are, designed for unity of command and the full exploitation of the various forces to be employed. The command structure actually used during the build-up phase of the Cuban contingency was predicated upon clear-cut channels of authority and responsibility. As stipulated in planning guidance, CINCLANT was provided with staff augmentation personnel and retained responsibility as the Joint Task Force Commander. The Army, Navy and Air Force components were clearly delineated and functioned in close cooperation, with unity of purpose and maximum mutual support. The contributory efforts of the other Commanders in Chief involved, namely, CINCSTRIKE, CINCONAD, CINCPAC and CINCARIB, were laudatory and without restraint. Similarly, the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines all placed any resources requested or otherwise considered necessary at the immediate disposal of Admiral Dennison.

- It is considered that the subject article is based upon misinformation regarding the Unified Command system and does not recognize the responsibilities that each of the unified commanders has within his assigned geographic area. Specific charges levelled by the article, that Service rivalry and competition for authority crippled the operations, or that the civilian secretaries attempted to conduct the operations, are not supported by fact and are considered invalid.

- Additionally, it is considered that the task organization for planning; the task organization for the conduct of operations both during the initial assaults and for ensuing operations within Cuba; and the command relationships as specified in our Cuban contingency plans; are clearly established, militarily sound and those best designed to ensure an early and successful conclusion with a minimum of confusion and loss of personnel.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLK- 89-32
By SKP NARA, Date 3/24/91

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- Commander Mereness, USN, CINCLANT Public Affairs Officer, was consulted in the preparation of this analysis.

- An alternative draft memorandum on this subject and addressed to the President has been prepared in accordance with instructions.

- For an analytical discussion of the subject article, see Enclosure.

Recommendations - It is recommended that:

a. The refutation of the subject article set forth supra, be discussed with the President and with such Public Affairs officials as may be appropriate.

b. The draft Memorandum be forwarded if appropriate.

Opinion as to Recommendation:

Director, J-3 concurs

J. H. Chau.

Director, Joint Staff

R

(concurs) (~~nonconcurs~~)

Talking Paper prepared by: Captain M.A. Hadden, Jr. USN
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X 75477

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DRAFT CM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Analysis of an Article Appearing in the ST LOUIS
POST DISPATCH of 30 November 1962, Concerning
Alleged Mishandling of Cuban Invasion Organization
Planning

1. Recently you expressed an interest in the accuracy of an article by ~~Brigadier General~~ Thomas R. Phillips, USA (~~Retired~~) which appeared in the ST LOUIS POST DISPATCH on 30 November 1962. The article was ~~sharply~~ critical of what was purported to be our Task Organizations for both the planning and employment phases of an invasion of Cuba. The article further criticized command relationships in regard to our contingency planning.

2. An analysis of the points raised in the article indicates that the author ^{submits a misinterpretation of} utilized a paucity of fact, mis-^{related} interpreted the command relationships, and over-emphasized minor problems. ~~In short, references in the article which~~ would indicate that it reflects statements made by, or views held by, senior military men are untrue. Similarly, none of the criticisms levelled by the article are considered valid.

3. Command relationships for the ^{Cuban} planning ~~for~~, as well as the conduct of operations in regard to Cuba were, ^{in accord with} and are designed for unity of command and the full exploitation of the various forces to be employed. The command structure actually used during the build-up phase of the Cuban contingency was predicated upon clear-cut channels of authority and responsibility. As stipulated in planning guidance, CINCLANT was provided with staff augmentation personnel and retained responsibility as the Joint Task Force Commander.

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The Army, Navy and Air Force components were clearly delineated and functioned in close cooperation, with unity of purpose and maximum mutual support. The contributory efforts of the other Commanders in Chief involved, namely, CINCSRIKE, CINCONAD, CINCPAC and CINCARIB, were laudatory and without restraint. Similarly, the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines all placed any resources requested or otherwise considered necessary at the immediate disposal of Admiral Dennison.

4. It is my opinion that the subject article is based upon misinformation regarding the Unified Command system and does not recognize the responsibilities that each of the unified commanders has within his assigned geographic area. Specific charges levelled by the article, that Service rivalry and competition for authority crippled the operations, or that the civilian secretaries attempted to conduct the operations, are not supported by fact and are considered invalid.

5. Further, I consider that the task organization for planning; the task organization for the conduct of operations both during the initial assaults and for ensuing operations within Cuba; and the command relationships as specified in our Cuban contingency plans are clearly established, militarily sound and those best designed to ensure an early and successful termination of hostilities with minimum casualties.

Writer:
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ENCLOSURE

ANALYTICAL DISCUSSION

1. In attempting to bear out these criticisms, the author utilized a paucity of fact, misinterpretation of command relationships and over-emphasis of minor problems.

2. An analysis of the command structure actually used for the planning and for the deployment of forces during the build-up phase of the Cuban contingency discloses clear-cut channels of authority and responsibility. CINCLANT was provided with staff augmentation personnel as planned and retained responsibility as the Joint Task Force Commander. The Army, Navy and Air Force components were clearly delineated and functioned in close cooperation, with unity of purpose and with maximum mutual support. Command arrangements for the conduct of the actual operations were, and are, designed for unity of command and the full exploitation of the capabilities of the various forces to be employed. For reference, Command Relationship charts for: planning of all Cuban contingency plans, implementation of the air strike plan; implementation of the invasion plan prior to completion of the airborne and amphibious assaults; and for ensuing operations in Cuba after the initial assaults; are attached.

3. The charge that Service rivalry and competition for authority had a crippling effect on the planned operations is not supported by fact. This is clearly evidenced by the Commander of the Army's Continental Army Command, General Powell, and the Commander of the Air Force Tactical Air Command, General Sweeney, functioning as around-the-clock component commanders of the over-all commander, Admiral Dennison of the Atlantic Command. The Army, Navy, Air Force and

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Marines all placed any resources requested or otherwise considered necessary at the immediate disposal of Admiral Dennison.

4. In examining the article in detail, while the author first noted the existence of Army Atlantic (ARLANT) and Air Force Atlantic (AFLANT) and correctly listed the commanders of these two organizations, he mistakenly interpreted the abbreviations to be Army, Atlantic Fleet, and Air Force, Atlantic Fleet; not recognizing that ARLANT and AFLANT are components of the Atlantic Command; the third component being the Atlantic Fleet.

5. The statement that AFLANT includes Air Force crew training bases in Arizona and "many others of similar lack of consequence to the Navy Commander in Chief, Atlantic, CINCLANT," is false. True, the Tactical Air Command includes the foregoing; however, these are not included in TAC forces allocated to CINCLANT. This is a false expansion of the preceding paragraph which states that AFLANT "consists of the Air Force Tactical Air Command or such units of it as may be needed for a particular operation."

6. The announcement purported to have been made by the Atlantic Command that the "Atlantic Command has taken over all the Army and tactical air forces and their training centers in the US," is denied by the CINCLANT Public Affairs officer.

7. The article recognizes that the Atlantic Command is a unified command with military responsibilities throughout the Atlantic Ocean area, the Caribbean Sea, and part of the Indian Ocean; however, it promptly dismisses the joint staff aspects of a unified command.

8. The reference to JTF 4 is based on misinformation as this planning organization is designed only to handle CINCLANT responsibilities in Africa, South of the Sahara. Hence, the

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article is correct in stating that JTF 4 does not appear in the preliminary operations for invasion of Cuba; this organization has no responsibilities in regard to Cuba.

9. The charge that there was no unification or unified command organization in existence at the stage at which preparations ceased is incorrect. In fact, Admiral Dennison, as CINCLANT, held the responsibilities of the Joint Task Force Commander and his staff functioned accordingly.

10. The statement that LtGen Howze, CG XVIII Corps was designated as the JTF commander is partially correct in that he would have been Commander JTF Cuba once forces were successfully ashore. As such, under CINCLANT, he would have had responsibilities for all operations in Cuba. The statement that the command would have extended only over the Army, that the Marines would have operated separately, and that the Navy would have conducted operations in its own way, is entirely false.


11. Most of the remainder of the article is based on misinformation regarding the Unified Command system and does not recognize the responsibilities that each unified commander has within his assigned geographic area. The author is not aware that the US Strike Command was created both to provide for the training, provision and deployment of forces in support of the other unified commanders, and for the conduct of such specific contingency operations as might be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was not, and is not, intended that he be made responsible for contingency operations in Cuba.

12. The concluding statement of the article which charges that the civilian secretaries were trying to conduct the operation is equally untrue. The deployment of forces within CONUS, the conduct of the quarantine, and the reconnaissance operations all were carried out by the military as directed through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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DURING IMPLEMENTATION
OF OPLAN 312-62




NOTES

1. For operations supporting defense of GTMO
2. COMNAVTF to be designated by CINCLANTFLT
3. OPCON of all air forces assigned targets not related to defense of GTMO

* Norfolk initially, then to be announced

DURING IMPLEMENTATION
OF OPLAN 316-62*




* Prior to establishment of JTF CUBA

** Initial location then to be announced

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DURING IMPLEMENTATION
OF OPLAN 316-62*



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* When Joint Task Force Cuba is established

** Initial location then to be announced

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The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited UMI 2005

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A	T98	X	1298	X	(3)	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
B	11	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
C	1299	X	1	105	745	1000	1000	545	545	1000	1000	1000	1000	X
D	1300	X	1	3	3	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	X	X	X
E	1301	X	1000	1000	X	3	4	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
F	1302	X	(100)	1000	1000	1000	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
G	1303	X	(50)	7	3	4	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

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The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited: An International Collection of Documents, from the Bay of Pigs to the Brink of Nuclear War

Published by: ProQuest Information and Learning, 300 North Zeeb Rd., PO Box 1346, Ann Arbor, MI 48106, USA

The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited: An International Collection of Documents, from the Bay of Pigs to the Brink of Nuclear War reproduces a comprehensive collection of records from the archives of the three key governments involved in the most dangerous confrontation of the Cold war. Declassified records from the United States, Russia and Cuba significantly advance analysis of the historical foundations of the missile crisis, the policy calculations and considerations of President John F. Kennedy and premiers Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro, and the overt and covert military and paramilitary operations that combined to bring the world to the threshold of a nuclear exchange. Topics extensively covered in the documentation include the failed U.S.-led invasion at the Bay of Pigs, renewed attempts to overthrow Castro through Operation Mongoose and Operation Northwoods, U.S. military contingency planning for conflict with Cuba, naval warfare, Soviet and Cuban decision making and communications during the crisis, and the repercussions for U.S.-Soviet relations, and Soviet-Cuban relations in its aftermath. Materials were identified, obtained, assembled and indexed by the National Security Archive, a non-profit Washington D.C. based research institute and library. The microfiche collection is accompanied by a printed guide and index.

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